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JUDICIAL POWER & ILLUSION: THE REPUBLIC OF
CHINA'S COUNCIL OF GRAND JUSTICES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
F. Fraser Mendel
Abstract: The Republic of China underwent a rapid political transformation from
an authoritarian nation to a democratic state which required change at every level of the
governmeht. The ROC's Council of Grand Justices has contributed to this period of
reform through a number of constitutional interpretations which have resulted in greater
individual liberties and further restrictions on government actions. This has been
accomplished even though the Council operates against substantive and procedural
limitations on its powers. A review of these Council interpretations from the past
decade reveals that the Council has made steady inroads towards fulfilling its role as the
supreme judicial body of the ROC. The Council, however, is not sufficiently protected
from the influence of other government branches and still issues decisions carefully.
The ROC government must ensure the Council is isolated from political influences
before the Council will be able to impartially exercise the full range of its
constitutionally mandated authority.

In the last decade, the Republic of China (ROC) experienced extensive
Although its Constitution- proclaimed the ROC a
political reform.1
representative democracy in 1947, a single political party led by the President
controlled the government from World War II until the 1980s, 2 indicating a
lack of full democratic representation. As the ROC experienced rapid
economic development and the population benefited from increased standards
of living and education, the ruling party responded to growing public pressure
for change by reforming the government. 3 While significant, these reforms
did not occur quickly or equally in all branches of the government; for those
branches still unable to exercise the full scope of their constitutionally
authorized power, the struggle for reform continues.
A primary actor in this ongoing reform process is the Council of Grand
Justices (Council), in which the ROC Constitution vests the power to
interpret the Constitution and unify conflicting laws.4 The interpretive power
1 Nicholas D. Kristof, Taiwan Walks Gingerly on the Path to Reform, N.Y. TIMES, February 24,
1991, at D4.
2 JOHN K. FAiRBANK & EDWIN 0. REIscHAuER, CHINA: TRADION AND TRANSFORMATION 477
- SHAW YU-MING, BEYOND THE ECONOMIC
MIRACLE 22 (1989).
4 See CHUNG-HUA MIN-KuO HSIEN-FA (CONSTrrtMrION OF THE REPUBuC OF CHINA) (promulgated
Jan. 1. 1947, effective Dec. 25, 1947) [hereinafter ROC CONST.] at art. 78 in HsIN-PIEN Liu FA

TS'AN-K'AO FA-LING P'AN-CHIEH CH'UAN-SHU (CURRENT COMPLETE REFERENCE BOOK OF THE SIX LAWS,
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implies a responsibility for the Council to uphold the Constitution and
promote the people's constitutional liberties. 5 In the past, however, the
Council rarely championed individuals' constitutional rights, suggesting that
despite the significant powers delegated to it by the Constitution, its actual
authority was illusory. 6 The Council's vulnerability to external political
pressures resulted in tepid judicial decisions that merely served to screen the
government's autocratic actions from public view. 7 Although the political and
economic reforms of the past fifteen years have increased the ability of the
Council to operate in its interpretative capacity, the Council continues to be
restricted by other barriers.
This Comment analyzes the progress of the Council in reclaiming and
exercising its constitutional powers of interpretation and unification. Part I
reviews the historical setting, constitutional structure and judicial organization
of the ROC government. Part II focuses on the Council, the structural
limitations placed on the Council, and the resulting impact on Council
interpretations. Part III traces the dichotomy found in many of the Council's
judicial decisions: interpretations alternatively either exemplify the Council's
progressive trend and reflect the Council's inaction when faced with potential
political conflict. This Comment concludes that the Council, despite
structural and procedural restrictions, is successfully expanding its authority
to fulfill its constitutional role. Although this progress is gradual, recent
judicial interpretations show a considerable increase in the Council's
willingness to protect individuals' constitutional liberties and to define
constitutional limits on government activities. The Council's ultimate success,
however, depends on further government reform to effectively isolate the
Council from external influences.

DECISIONS, AND INTERPRETATIONS) (Vu-nan

tu-shu kung-ssu) [hereinafter BOOK OF THE Six LAWS
(Wu-nan)], translatedin MAJOR LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIwAN 9 (James C. Liu et al. eds.,
1991) [hereinafter MAJOR LAWS].
5 See Herbert H.P. Ma, The Council of Grand Justices of the Republic of China: Its Role in a
Changing Society, in Secretariat of the Judicial Yuan, SZU-FA-YUAN TA-FA-KUAN SHIH-HSIEN
SSU-SHIH-CHOU-NIEN CHI-NIEN-LUN-WAN-CHI (SyMposp~ir INHONOR OF THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS MADE BY THE GRAND JUSTICES, JUDICIAL YUAN) 520, 516 (1988)
[hereinafter SYMPOSIUM].
6 From 1948 to 1976, the Council rendered only one interpretation at the petition of a citizen; from
1976 to 1985 it rendered 28; and since 1985 it has rendered more than 30. See Tables of Statistics in
SYMPOsItrM, id. at 570.
7 See e.g. infra text accompanying note 131-137, where the Council's vulnerability to coordinate
branches' angry reactions is exemplified by the Legislative Yuan passing the Council Law, restricting the
Council's authority.

WINTER 1993

I.

JUDICIAL POWER & ILLUSION

FORMATION OF THE ROC
The ROC was formed after the overthrow of the Ch'ing Dynasty in

1911.8 Despite the immediate declaration of the Republic, President Yuan
Shih-kai's attempt to become the new emperor initiated a period of civil war
lasting through the 1920s. 9 During that decade the Nationalist Party
(Kuomintang or KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) worked

The Nationalist
together in an uneasy alliance to reunite China. 10
Government launched the Northern Expedition in 1926 and, by the end of
1928, most of the country was reunified. 1
This brief respite ended in 1931 when the Japanese, tempted by the
rich natural resources in Manchuria and the perceived weakness of the
Chinese government, began military incursions. 12 The Chinese Communists,
purged from the KMT in 1927 and living primarily on the Kiangsi-Hunan
border, posed an additional threat to the Nationalist Government and kept the
country in turmoil. 13 The ROC had not yet adopted a constitution and World
War II further disrupted the drafting process as the country endured the
Japanese

invasion.14

Following Japan's defeat,

the KMT

and the

Communists, who had forged a precarious alliance against the Japanese,
renewed their civil war. 15
Although the KMT suffered military and political setbacks against the
Communists, the Constituent National Assembly adopted a Constitution in
8 11 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA 532 (Denis Twitchett & John K. Fairbank eds., 1983)
[hereinafter CHOC]. At this time, the ROC included only continental China. The island of Taiwan had
been ceded to Japan in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese war, an act which spurred popular protest
against the government and hastened the end of the Ching Dynasty. Taiwan did not come back under
Chinese suzerainty until the end of World War Two.
9 The overthrow of the Ching dynasty resulted in extreme instability in China. Dr. Sun Yat Sen
realized that a strong military force was needed to keep China unified, so he relinquished his position as
President to General Yuan Shih-kai, the governor-general of the Hebei region. II CHOC, supra note 8,
at 532; FAIRBANK & REISCHAUER, supra note 2, at 421.
10 Though the KMT and CCP separated as foes, it has been argued that both inherited Dr. Sun Yat
Sen's legacy - the KMT for its military strength in unifying the country and ending the "unequal
treaties" which western countries had imposed on it, and the CCP in pursuing social reforms and
identifying the People's Livelihood with communism. See CONRAD BRANDT ET AL., A DOCUNIENTARY
HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM 66-69 (1966).
11 The Northern Expedition, a military and political offensive which started in the south and ended
in Peking, brought most of the independent warlords under Nationalist control. 12 CHOC, supra note 8,
at 575.
12 13 CHOC, supra note 8, at 129.
13 Id.at 183.
14 Id. at 513.
15 13 CHOC, supranote 8, at 728.

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 2 No. I

January 1947.16 Due to the civil war with the Communists, President Chiang
Kai-shek promptly suspended the Constitution with an Emergency Decree
authorized by the "Temporary Provisions for the Duration of Mobilization to
Suppress the Rebellion." 17 The autumn of 1949 brought the end of KMT
control of the Mainland and the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek with his forces to
Taiwan. 18 This war, however, remained active until 197819 and it was not
until the reforms of the 1980s that the government finally repealed martial
law. 20
A.

ConstitutionalDevelopment in the ROC

The Republic of China officially came into existence on January 1,
1912.21 Dr. Sun Yat Sen, who played an instrumental role in the revolution,
envisioned a complex government utilizing Western government elements and
traditional Chinese structures. 22 Dr. Sun's political theory outlined three
stages of revolution: national unification by military means, political tutelage,
and promulgation of a constitution. 23 Essentially reunified by the Northern
Expedition in 1928, China entered its period of political tutelage under the
KMT. 24 Dr. Sun intended to use this period to train the Chinese people in
exercising their political rights and to educate them sufficiently to achieve

16 Hungdah Chiu & Jyh-pin Fa, The Legal System of the Republic of China in Taiwan, in MODERN
LEGAL17SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA 610, 605-661 (Kenneth Robert Redden, ed., 1984).
See REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK 1990-91 at 90 (1990) [hereinafter YEARBOOK).
18 The KMTs defeat has been attributed to the Japanese invasion which drove the KMT out of the
cities where their base of support existed. Combined with widespread economic disruption, this resulted
in the almost total demoralization of KMT forces. See 13 CHOC, supra note 8, at 584-99.
19
The PRC continued artillery bombardment of ROC-controlled islands in the Taiwan Straits until
1978.2 0YEARBOOK, supra note 17, at 90.
FARBANK & REISCHAUER, supra note 2, at 477-478.
21
See id.
at 414.
22 Chinese reformers at the turn of the century implemented a Western style legal structure over
China's social structure as a means of gaining independence from Western powers. See Jerome A. Cohen,
China's ChangingConstitution, 76 China. Q. 794, 795 (1978); Herbert H.P. Ma, General Featuresof the
Law and Legal System of the Republic of China,in TRADE AND INVESTMENT INTAIWAN: THE LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT INTHE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 4 (Herbert H.P. Ma ed., 1985); an important element
which made integration of Western political theory into Chinese society difficult was the Chinese
dichotomy between the liandfa concepts of law. Li can be translated as "guidance by right example,"
whereasfa is "guidance by punishment." At least as far back as 535 B.C., a conflict has existed between
these two concepts of law. For more than two millennia, Chinese society stressed Itand the personal
relationship, rather than the rigid structure offa, which is the basis of Western law. See 2 JOSEPH
NEEDHAM, SCIENCE & CIVILIZATION INCHINA 519 (1956).
23 Chiu & Fa, supranote 16, at 609.
24
.1d.at 610.
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theory, China could then move
local self-government. 25 According to his 26
constitution.
republican
a
under
into self-rule
The escalating conflict with Japan and the domestic turmoil in the early
1930s prompted a growing public demand for a constitution as a national
unifying symbol. 27 The KMT formed various committees that worked on
drafts during the 1930s and promulgated a draft constitution in 1936 as a
stopgap measure. 28 The drafting process, resumed after World War II, was
influenced by severe political pressures generated from the civil war with the
Communists. 29 The KMT conceded major changes to various interest
groups, such as wealthy landowners, in order to pass the Constitution and
became effective in
legitimize the ROC government. 30 The Constitution
31
today.
effect
in
remains
and
1947
December
The Constitution outlined a government structure headed by a
President whom the National Assembly selects. 32 The President appoints the
Presidents of the Executive, Judicial and Examination Yuans. 33 The
Executive Yuan formulates policies, 34 the Examination Yuan controls the
selection process of government officials, 35 and the Judicial Yuan interprets
and Control
laws and adjudicates cases. 36 The Presidents of the Legislative
37
Yuans are elected from among their respective members.
Chiang Kai-shek became the first President of the ROC. He first
gained effective control of the ROC in 1943 when he became chairman of the
Supreme National Defense Council, in addition to his roles as chairman of the
Military Affairs Commission and as Director-General of the KMT. 38 In
1948, the National Assembly convened in Nanking to confirm Chiang as
President and adopt a set of Temporary Provisions aimed at assisting the

251d.
26
FAiRBANK & RISCHAUER, supra note 2, at 412.
27 Chiu &Fa, supra note 16, at 610.
28 Lawrence Shao-liang Liu, Judicial Review and Emerging Constitutionalism: The Uneasy Case
for the Republic of Chinaon Taiwan, 39 Am. J. Comp. L. 1001, 1006-1007 (1991).
29 Chiu & Fa, supra note 16, at 610.
301d.
31Id.
32 ROC CONST., supra note 4, at art. 27, "The functions of the National Assembly shall be as
(1) To elect the President and the Vice President ... ."
follows:
33
Id. at arts. 55 (Executive Yuan), 78 (Judicial Yuan), 84 (Examination Yuan).
34
Id. at art. 57.
35
.1d. at art. 86.
36
Id. at art. 78.
37
Id. at arts. 66 (Legislative Yuan) and 92 (Control Yuan).
38
JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 459 (1990).

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 2 No. I

government in its fight against the Communists.3 9 The Temporary Provisions
gave the President extensive powers to run the country unhampered by
constitutional procedures. 40 Under Temporary Provisions 1 and 2, the
President could take any emergency measure needed to protect the state or
41
the people from immediate dangers or serious financial crises.
These Temporary Provisions were enacted in accordance with Articles
39 and 43 of the Constitution. Article 39 grants the President power to
declare martial law with the approval of the Legislative Yuan, 42 and Article
43 gives the President authority to issue Emergency Decrees by resolution of
the Executive Yuan. 43 President Chiang used Articles 39 and 43 to justify
44
issuing orders during the ensuing martial law period.
After the 1949 move to Taiwan, the KMT amended the Temporary
Provisions several times. One amendment, adopted in 1960, waived the
constitutionally mandated two-term limit on the President, allowing Chiang
Kai-shek to remain in power until his death in 1976.45 Another amendment,
adopted in 1972, authorized the government to conduct supplementary
elections for representative bodies in areas of China that it actually
46
controlled.
The adoption of the Temporary Provisions, the suspension of the
Constitution, and the implementation of various Emergency Decrees began
the period of strong martial law in the ROC. After the Communist's mainland
victory and the KMT's subsequent retreat to Taiwan, the KMT undertook
47
extensive reforms of its political party structure and the government.
Chiang Kai-shek used martial law powers to control the economy and
39 See Chiu & Fa, supra note 16, at 610-611.
40 Id.
41 Id.

42 ROC CONST., supra note 4, at art. 39, "The President may, in accordance with law, declare
martial law with the approval of, or subject to confirmation by, the Legislative Yuan. When the
Legislative Yuan deems it necessary, it may by resolution request the President to terminate martial rule."
43 Id.at art. 43, "In case of natural calamity, an epidemic, or a national financial or economic crisis
that calls for emergency measures, the President, during the recess of the Legislative Yuan, may, by
resolution of the Executive Yuan Council and in accordance with the Law on Emergency Orders, issue
emergency orders, proclaiming such measures as may be necessary to cope with the situation. Such orders
shall, within one month after issuance, be presented to the Legislative Yuan for confirmation; in case the
Legislative Yuan withholds confirmation, the said orders shall forthwith cease tobe valid."
44 Chiu & Fa, supra note 16, at 611.
45
Id.
46 Id.Because the ROC government only controlled Taiwan and several small islands, nationwide
elections could not be held. As a temporary measure, until the government could regain control of the
mainland, these supplementary elections were held to replace elected officials who retired.
47 Wu Wen--cheng, "Transformation of the KMT," in GE'rnNG TO KNOW THE KMT SEauEs K-4
(1989).
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develop agriculture and industry. 48 Due to the relative lack of an indigenous

political structure on Taiwan, little opposition existed to the implementation
of the wide-ranging social reform policies. 49 The reform programs were so
extensive that neither Chiang Kai-shek's death in 1976 nor the volatile
political atmosphere created by the U.S. withdrawal of its official recognition
in 1979 seriously disturbed the ROC's stability.50 These policies contributed
significantly to the ROC's economic growth.
Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, became President of
the ROC in 1978.51 Chiang Ching-kuo's rule ushered in the beginning of
political liberalization.5 2 As the authoritarian grip of the KMT government
loosened, opposition groups formed even before the repeal of the
anti-sedition laws. 53 Under Chiang Ching-kuo's economic modernization
plan, by the end of 1986 the ROC prospered with a rapid growth rate, a rising
annual per capita income and the world's largest foreign exchange reserves of
$76 billion.5 4 He also made political concessions to the Taiwan-bom
middle-class majority that resented the past political domination by the
KMT's post-1945 mainland immigrants. 55 His death in 1987 came in the
of political reforms that faced stiff conservative resistance within the
midst 56
KMT.
Vice-president Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo as
President. As the first Taiwan-bom President, he has continued the reform
movement. 57 President Lee finalized the repeal of the Emergency Decree,
ended the Temporary Provisions, implemented a Council ruling which limited
58
National Assembly member terms, and supported government restructuring.
Although the reform movement produced tangible economic results, it did not
fully address the legal issues which arose when the ROC returned to
constitutional rule. Even the government restructuring under President Lee

48 See FAIRBANK & REISCHAUER, supra note 2, at 479.
49 Prior to the KMT's retreat to Taiwan, KMT garrison forces violently suppressed an uprising by
local residents. This event, which occurred February 28, 1947, is known as "228" and may be another
reason that the KMT reforms offollowing years met little opposition. Id. at 475.
50 See id.at 480-481.
51
1d. at 478.
52 d.
53 See e.g. Transition on Trial: PoliticsofDestiny, ECONOMIST, Mar. 5, 1988, at S16.
54 Selig S. Harrison, TaiwanAfter Chiang Ching-kuo, FOREIGN AF. 790 (Spring 1988).
55
Id.
56 Id.
57
See FArRBANK & REIscHAUER, supra note 2, at 478.
58
See YEARBooK, supranote 17, at 199.

164
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has not clarified the Council's constitutional authority nor has it ended the
political power struggles which impact Council interpretations.
B.

Current Government Structure in the ROC

In order to understand the role of the Council and the structural
limitations upon its power, a brief introduction to the framework and political
development of the ROC government is necessary. The ROC government
consists of five branches (yuans) with an extensive system of checks and
balances, although for many years this was not the de facto form of
government. The exigencies of war, insurrection, economic dislocation, and
political isolation distorted the constitutionally established structure of
government; the reforms of the early 1980s, however, forced a return to the
ROC's original democratic ideal. Although entrenched interests often made
implementing institutional and political change difficult during the ROC's
period of political reform, 59 the governing power shifted from the Executive
Yuan, where the recently terminated Emergency Decree had placed it, to the
Legislative Yuan, as originally delegated by the Constitution. 60
1.

The Presidentandthe NationalAssembly

The President oi the ROC has considerable powers as chief of state.
Selected by the National Assembly every six years, 61 the President
commands the military, convenes the National Assembly, promulgates laws
and appoints civil service officials and military officers. 62 The President also
has three special powers: nominating high-ranking officials, resolving
inter-Yuan disputes, and exercising emergency powers.
As noted earlier, the President appoints the Premier of the Executive
Yuan; the President, Vice-president, and Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan;
and all members of the Examination Yuan.63 Should a dispute arises between
Yuans, the President has the power to call the Yuans together to solve it.64
59 Kristof, supranote 1, at D4.
60
ROC CONST., supra note 4, at art. 62.
61 Id. at art. 27 (selected by National Assembly) and 47 (six-year terms).
62
ld. at arts. 35-52.
63 Id. at arts. 55, 79, and 84.
64 Id. at art. 44, "In case of disputes between two or more Yuan other than those concerning which
there are relevant provisions in this Constitution, the President may call a meeting of the Presidents of the
Yuan [sic] concerned for consultation with a view to reaching a solution." MAJOR LAWS, supra note 42, at
10.
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The President may exercise discretionary emergency powers and take any
measure necessary to ensure national security. 65 To exercise these
emergency powers, the President may ignore the procedural requirements
66
contained in the Constitution.
The National Assembly is responsible for electing the President and
Vice-president. Although it has the power to recall the President and to
amend the Constitution, 67 the National Assembly has never recalled a
President or passed a constitutional amendment other than the wartime
68
Temporary Provisions.
The Five Yuans

2.

The Executive Yuan is responsible for formulating and implementing
national policy. The President of the Executive Yuan, usually referred to as
the Premier, has extensive authority to promulgate national policies and
control their implementation. 69 The Executive Yuan has three levels of
authority: the Executive Yuan Council, ministries and commissions, and
subordinate departments. *Theprimary policy-making body, the Executive
Yuan Council, is composed of the Premier, Vice Premier, heads of the
ministries and commissions, and the ministers of state. 70 It provides the final
authorization for statutory and budgetary bills, martial law, and other vital
65

ld.at art. 43.
66 Chiu & Fa, supra note 16, at 611.
67
ROC CONST., supranote 4, at art 27.
68 See Chiu & Fa, supra note 16, at 618. The National Assembly played an important role in
validating the Temporary Provisions and Emergency Decree to suspend the Constitution during the period
of Communist rebellion. The National Assembly officially meets once every six years to elect a new
President and Vice-president (ROC CONST., supra note 4, at art. 29) or for an extraordinary session if a
special event occurs (id.at art. 30). While the government was in Nanking, delegates from all over China
were elected to the National Assembly's first session. The Constitution provided for fiurther elections to be
held throughout China every six years (id.at art. 28). After moving to Taiwan, the National Assembly
became a permanent organization with a fixed membership. President Chiang Kai-Shek had the National
Assembly form committees to study how to retake the mainland and then granted committee members
high "stipends" for their work. The delegates were "frozen" in their positions until elections could be held
again in all provinces of China.
The delegates' more than forty years of tenure and compensation became the subject of bitter
opposition and resulted in a constitutional challenge to the validity of the law keeping them in office. In
June 1990, the Council of Grand Justices announced an interpretation stating that National Assembly
members who had been elected on the mainland had to retire by December 31, 1991. This interpretation
played a major role in Taiwan's reforms by removing a powerful group of conservative politicians who
reform efforts. YEARBooK, supranote 17, at 9.
had dampened
69
See ROC CONSS., supra note 4, at art. 57.
70
ld. at art. 58.
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matters of state which are to be submitted to the Legislative Yuan. 7 1 The
eight ministries and various commissions comprise the Executive Yuan's
primary administrative level and handle affairs such as domestic and foreign,
defense, finance, education, justice, economics and communications. 72
The Legislative Yuan enacts legislation and confirms certain orders
issued by the Executive Yuan. 73 Although the Constitution set the Legislative
Yuan's membership at 773, membership steadily decreased since the ROC's
move from the mainland because no elections had been held to replace the
original mainland positions of members who had died or retired. 74 By the end
of 1991, however, all legislators who had held positions since the last ROC
mainland election in 1948 had retired, and full elections took place in
December 1992. 75
The Legislative Yuan's primary powers include
76
confirming emergency orders and martial law and examining budget bills.
The Control Yuan, as the highest supervisory governmental branch of
the ROC, oversees the other branches of government. 77 It must approve any
official appointed to an office and can impeach officials who violate their
official duties. The Control Yuan censures officials who commit infractions
and audits other government branches' activities. 78
The Examination Yuan, established under Article 83 of the
Constitution, manages the employment of all civil service personnel. 7 9 It is
divided into three bodies: a policy-making Council, the Ministry of
Examination, and the Ministry of Personnel. These bodies regulate the
examination system through which all non-presidential appointees must pass
in order to qualify for government employment.
The Constitution established the Judicial Yuan as the highest judicial
government branch of the state. 80 It has the exclusive power of constitutional
interpretation and maintains jurisdiction over all civil, criminal and
administrative cases as well as disciplinary proceedings against public
71 Id.
72
YEARBOOY, supra note 17, at 115.
73
ROC CONST., supra note 4, arts. 62 and 57.
74
FARBANK & REISCHAUER, supra note 2, at 477.
75 In that election the KMT won only 53 percent of the legislative seats while the Democratic
Progressive Party, the main opposition party, won 32 percent. Although the KMT maintained control of
the legislature, the full elections were viewed by many, including Secretary-General Dr. James Soong of
the KMT, as a significant defeat for the KMT. After Election: Crisisfor KMT, SoUrH CHINA MORNING
POsT,7Dec.
21, 1992.
6
ROC COrST., supranote 4, at art. 63.
77 Id.at art. 97.
78
Id. at art. 90.
79
ld. at art. 83.
80
1d. at art. 77.
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officials. 8 ' The Judicial Yuan is basically an administrative framework
linking together four distinct sub-branches: the Supreme, High and District
courts (regular courts); the Administrative Court; the Committee on the
Discipline of Public Functionaries; and the Council of Grand Justices. The
Supreme Court is the highest adjudicatory body within the Judicial Yuan and
82
serves as the appellate court for the High Court. The High and District
Courts handle both civil and criminal cases. The Administrative Court deals
strictly with cases brought against government bodies and can grant
administrative relief from regulations. 83 The Administrative Court is a court
84
of final appeal and its decisions are not reviewed by the regular courts. The
Committee on the Discipline of Public Functionaries deals only with
allegations that government officials have violated their duties or committed
crimes. 85 The Constitution places the responsibility for interpreting the
Constitution and unifying conflicting interpretations of statutes and
86 The Organic Law of the
regulations with the "several" Grand Justices.
Judicial Yuan, promulgated in March 1947, authorized the formation of the
87 The issue as to
Council with a maximum of 17 Grand Justice positions.
whether the Council is a true "court" and88 the Justices true "judges" under the
Constitution remains an ongoing debate.
THE COUNCIL OF GRAND JUSTICES

II.

Created as an impartial interpreter of the Constitution, the Council
could not immediately carry out its duties due to interference from the other
Yuans. Dr. Sun Yat Sen had a high respect for the separation of powers
concept at the time he developed his theories of politics and governing
81
82

See id. at art. 78.
Fa-yuan Tsu-chih-fa (Law of the Court Organization), (promulgated Oct. 28, 1932), at art. 48 in
Book 6 in BOOK OF THE SIXLAWS (Wu-nan).
83 Chiu & Fa, supranote 16, at 630.
84 Id.
85
1d. at 631.
86
ROC CoNsT., supra note 4, at arts. 78 and 79; Szu-fa-yuan Tsu-chih-fa (Organic Law of the
Judicial Yuan) [hereinafter Judicial Law] (promulgated Mar. 31, 1947), Book 6 in BOOK OF THE SIX LAWS
(Wu-nan). While the President and Vice-president of the Judicial Yuan preside over the Council's
meetings and their names are printed with the other Grand Justices, they vote only in the case of a tie.
The Council is modeled on the European civil law countries' constitutional courts, which provide
interpretations of the Constitution and of laws.
87 Though the Judicial Law provides for up to 17 Grand Justices, the most ever seated on the
in SYMPOStuM. id. at 570.
Council
8 8 at one time was 15. See Tables of Statistics
Infra text accompanying notes 129-130.
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structures and the ROC Constitution incorporated this concept. 8 9 Despite the
separation of power theory's influence on the drafting of the Constitution, the
ROC did not develop strongly independent branches of government. While
structurally separate from one another, during the four decades of martial law
the five Yuans depended heavily on presidential directives to function. 90 This
emphasis on direct control by the president reduced the importance of
inter-branch cohesiveness. Information, control and power ran vertically
within each Yuan from the President down, restricting communication
between Yuans because the power was concentrated at the top. This limited
coordination between the branches' lower levels where policies were actually
implemented.
The influence of other Yuans on the Council expanded during the
KMT's period of strict government and economic control. As the dominant
political party, the KMT dictated ROC government policy since KMT
members occupied prominent Yuan positions. While the KMT's hard-line
rule has since softened, the potential still exists for one Yuan with politically
favored members to influence other Yuans. The Council, as a sub-branch of
the Judicial Yuan, does not operate impartially because it is not protected
from the intrusions of other branches.
A.

The Powers andLimitations ofthe Council

The Council of Grand Justices' primary role within the ROC judicial
system is to exercise constitutional review powers. 9 1 Other branches of
government can apply to the Council for an interpretation of the
constitutionality of a particular course of action. In these cases, the Council's
interpretations, while advisory in nature, give the Council opportunities to
influence ROC policy. 92 The bulk of cases the Council hears are advisory;
89

See Ma, supra note 22, at 5. The ROC followed the Japanese and German models in establishing
its judicial system, as evidenced by many parts of the legal code which refer to precedents from those
countries. See e.g., references to Japanese and German law in the Civil Code. Mn Fa, Book One:
General Principles, Chapter Two, in BOOK OF THE Six LAWS (Wu-nan). The influence of the American
Constitution is also evident, particularly in regards to the separation of powers. Herbert H.P. Ma, "The
Influence of the U.S. Constitution on the 1947 Republic of China Constitution," in THE UNITED STATES
CONSTrrtrON AND CONSTUrriONALISM INCHINA 53-55 (Kline ed., 1987).
90 Hu Fu, Cabinet Rule in the Republic of China:A ConstitutionalArgument, 4 J. Chinese L. 161,
168 (1990).
91 Ssu-fa Yuan Ta-fa-kuan Hui-yi Fa (Law Governing the Council of Grand Justices of the
Judicial Yuan), at art. 2 [hereinafter Council Law] (promulgated July 21, 1958). Book 6 in BOOK OF THE
Six LAWS (Wu-nan).
92 Id.
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93 Consequently, the
rarely does it play the role of an adjudicatory body.
Council does not operate under "case or controversy" or "political question"
94
limitations.
Grand Justices serve nine-year terms after receiving the appointment
President and the confirmation of the Control Yuan. 95 Grand Justices
the
of
can be re-appointed to serve additional terms.96 This term limit, contained in
the Judicial Law, is a contentious point because the Constitution stipulates
life terms for judges. 97 Although this discrepancy between the Judicial Law
and the Constitution significantly affects the operation of the Council, the
Council itself has not rendered an interpretation on the issue.
To date there have been five Councils of Grand Justices. The first ran
from 1949 to 1958, while the current one will run from 1985 to 1994.98 The
first Grand Council was very active, but toward the end of its term the
99
Legislative Yuan curbed the Council's powers by enacting the Council Law.
The second and third Councils had little opportunity to render interpretations
1°°
The fourth
during the height of President Chiang Kai-shek's power.
the reform
in
active
increasingly
became
and
Council began its term in 1976
01 The fifth Council has
death.'
period following President Chiang Kai-Shek's
so far issued a large number of interpretations, primarily petitioned by private
02
citizens.1

93 An important exception to this non-adjudicative rule occurred in May 1992, when the Legislative
Yuan authorized the Council to form a tribunal to hear cases regarding the constitutionality of political
parties. The authority to determine the constitutionality of political parties originally rested with the
Executive Yuan, but in the months preceding the first free election encouraged the government to turn
that authority over to a nominally impartial body. LegislatureApproves Revision of Civic Organizations
NEWS AGENCY, 4 July 1992, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, CNA File.
Law, CENTRAL
94
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which will only hear cases arising from actual controversies, the
Council can entertain questions of law raised by government agencies without a preceding conflict.
Further, it operates under no limitations regarding the political nature of a question which the U.S.
Supreme Court would defer to either the President or Congress to resolve. See Jyh-pin Fa, Constitutional
Developments in Taiwan: The Role of the Council of GrandJustices, 40 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 198, 201
Judicial Law, supra note 86, at art. 5.
(995%
96

See id. at art. 3.
ROC CONST., supra note 4, at art. 81, "Nojudge shall be removed from office unless he has been
found guilty of a criminal offense or subjected to disciplinary measures, or declared to be under
interdiction. No judge shall, except in accordance with law, be suspended or transferred or have his salary
reduced."
98 See Tables of Statistics in SYMPOsItUM, supra note 5i at 562-566.
99
lnfra text accompanying notes 131-137.
10 0
See Tables of Statistics in SYMPosIuM, supra note 5, at 563.
101 Id. at 565.
102 Id. at 566.
97
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The Council is empowered to both interpret constitutional issues and
unify statutory discrepancies.1 03 Yet, until the 1980s, the Council did not
render interpretations on many cases, confining the majority of its activities to
the unification of conflicting laws. 104 A contributing factor to the low number
of interpretations, in addition to KMT control, is that the supremacy of the
Council's constitutional interpretations is still unsettled. The inference can be
drawn that because the Constitution authorizes the Council to render
constitutional interpretations, these interpretations are as binding as legislative
enactments. 105 The Legislative Yuan, as the supreme law-making body in
the ROC, however, can enact laws contradicting Council interpretations if the
laws are not explicitly unconstitutional. 1 06 While an express constitutional
provision legitimizes the Legislative Yuan's action, the authority of the
Executive, Control and Examination Yuans to implement laws and regulations
that are contrary to Council interpretations is also unclear. In various cases
over the last 40 years, affected branches essentially ignored Council rulings
under the guise of slow implementation. 107 The Council's subsequent
inclusion in its interpretations of specific implementation deadlines in order to
force compliance with its decisions eventually became effective. 108 The
political issue over which Yuan possesses the higher constitutional power,
however, has not been definitively resolved.
The Council is not vested with the discretion to select the cases it
wants to hear. 109 If a petition requesting a constitutional interpretation meets
the basic requirements spelled out in the Council Law, the Council cannot
reject the petition." 0 Resolution of these cases can be difficult because the
Council Law imposes a "double three-fourths" approval requirement:
three-fourths of the Grand Justices must be present to form a quorum, and
three-fourths of the quorum must agree with the interpretation in order to

103 When a government department applying a law or regulation has a different opinion from that
previously expressed by the same or another department, it may petition the Council to make a binding
unified0interpretation.
See Council Law, supra note 91, at art. 4.
1 4 See Tables of Statistics in SYMPOSIUM, supra note 5, at 562-566.
105 Nigel N.T. Li and Joyce C. Fan, An Uncommon Case of Bigamy; An Uncommon Constitutional
Interpretation,
4 J. Chinese L. 69, 79 (1990).
10 6 See ROC CONST., supranote 4, at art. 62.
107 Fa, supranote 94, at 206.
108 Id.
109 Ma, supra note 5, at 513.
110 ld.
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issue an opinion. 111 Compromise, therefore, is an integral element of the
112

Councils daily work.
The Council's quorum requirement for unifying conflicting laws is
easier to meet than the quorum requirements for constitutional interpretations.
The Council is able to issue a unified interpretation when it is approved by a
majority of the Grand Justices at a meeting with a quorum of more than half
of the total number of Grand Justices." 3 Theoretically, the Council could
issue a unification interpretation with only five Grand Justices in agreement;
this creates the possibility that the Council could issue conflicting
interpretations. The Council prevents this occurrence through the informal
requirement that a minimum of twelve Grand Justices be present at all
u4
meetings.
Any government agency has standing to petition the Council for an
5 Private
interpretation of a specific constitutional provision or a law."
individuals may also apply for constitutional interpretations in situations
116
where they believe the government violated their constitutional rights.
With the exception of petitions from Administrative Court adjudications, an
individual must have appealed the case to the Supreme Court before
petitioning the Council. 117 If the Council renders a favorable interpretation,
8
the petitioner takes the case back to the Supreme Court for a new hearing.1
Prior to the reform period, government agencies, rather than individuals,
brought the majority of cases heard by the Council. 119
B.

Impediments to Attaining Full ConstitutionalAuthority

Although the ROC Constitution's advisory power gives the Council the
potential to set national policy through its judicial interpretations, other
factors limit the Council's actions. The reform period has encouraged greater
judicial activism, 120 but the Council is still unable to operate at its full
constitutional capacity. This will only be possible when the Council fully
1111d.
112 Id. at 512.
113 Council Law, supra note 91, at art. 13.
114 Interview with Herbert H.P. Ma, Grand Justice of the Council of Grand Justices, in Taipei,
1992).
Taiwan
Law, supra note 91, at art. 4.
Council
115 July
1161d.
117 Ma, supra note 5, at 513.
118 Fa, supra note 94, at 207.
119 See Tables of Statistics in SymposiuM, supra note 5, at 563.
120 Ma, supra note 5, at 510.
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repairs its damaged image, separates itself from the influence of the other
Yuans, and overcomes the restrictions of the Council Law.
A primary difficulty the Council labors under is its lingering image as a
KMT figurehead. This image problem stems from early in the ROC's official
martial law period which lasted from 1949 to 1987.121 At that time, the
Temporary Provisions gave the President, and consequently the KMT, broad
power to operate outside most constitutional limitations. 122 This reduced the
need for objective constitutional interpretations and forced the Council to
remain dormant.123 Since virtually no constitutional restrictions applied to
government decisions made under martial law, the few interpretations the
Second and Third Councils issued tended to legitimize the "strong-man"
system of government while marking the Council as a government tool with
illusory power. 124 This creates a problem for the Council today because the
Council's current effectiveness depends on the deference both the public and
private sectors give its otherwise unenforceable interpretations. Thus, the
Council's willingness to consider and rule on an increasing number of private
petitions is a wise course; the Council must shed any lingering perception that
it is a government puppet if it is to gamer respect as an authoritative impartial
body.
Another aspect of the Council's image problem is the controversy over
the constitutionality of the advisory functions of the Council. It has been
suggested that since the Council can decide the constitutionality of policies,
and thus influence policy planning,125 it infringes both on the Legislative
Yuan's power to develop and implement legislation and on the Control Yuan's
oversight ability. Although the Council's advisory opinions might be viewed
as contravening the Constitution's separation of powers intent, the Council
has an affirmative constitutional duty to decide the appropriate application of
a law or the constitutionality of a planned action. 126 While the Council
121 The KMT was not only the ruling party, but the only legal political party in Taiwan until 1987.
SHAW, supra note 3, at 27. "But the formation of new political parties was not allowed under the
Emergency Decree." Cultural Affairs of Central Comnittee of Kuomintang, "Rising Political and Social
Pluralism,"
in GETTING TO KNOW THE KMT SERIES 1-10 (1989).
12 2 See Chiu & Fa, supra note 16, at 611.
123 See Council Interp. Shih-86 which was adopted on August 15, 1960, but was not implemented
until 1979. This interpretation said that under the Constitution the court system should be controlled by
the Judicial Yuan and not the Control Yuan. See Compilation of Council of Grand Jutices'
Interpretations,
in BOOK OF THE Six LAWS (Wu-nan), supra note 4, at 2142.
12 4 Hu Fu, supranote 90, at 161.
125 Liu, supra note 28, at 1027.
12 6

ROC CONST., supra note 4, at art 78, "The Judicial Yuan shall interpret the Constitution and

shall have the power to unify the interpretation of laws and orders" and art. 79, "The Judicial Yuan shall
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continues to use its advisory power, these challenges threaten the Council's
credibility by questioning its basic constitutional authority.
A second major impediment to the Council's effective execution of its
Constitutional role is its susceptibility to internal and external political
The less than harmonious relationship between some
pressures.
sub-branches of the Judicial Yuan and the Council has resulted in situations
which challenge the Council's authority and eriforcement power. Although no
court likes to be reversed, more than normal dissension arises between
sub-branches due to the procedural requirements of the Council's appellate
process. When the Council overturns a Supreme or Administrative Court
decision by ruling a law or action unconstitutional, the successful petitioner's
case remands back to that original court. The Council risks antagonizing
judges who correctly used the law at the time of the case, only to have the
Council change the law on appeal. This resulted in several sub-branch
battles, particularly between the Council and the Administrative Court, in
which the other courts refused to rehear the cases. 127 If the Council could
dispose of these cases, it could alleviate unproductive squabbling in the
Judicial Yuan, reduce the number of times a petitioner must move between
judicial sub-branches, and also lower the amount of time spent by regular
court judges in retrying cases under different laws. The Council, however,
has been classified as an non-adjudicative body, and considerable debate
exists over the Justices' status within the Judicial Yuan. The Council does not
have a specific grant of an adjudicatory power from the Constitution, but
neither is it denied that power. Ironically, the simplest solution to this
difficulty can not be authorized by the Judicial Yuan; only the Legislative
Yuan can confer adjudicatory power on the Council. 128 Explicit authorization
by the Legislative Yuan, either in a separate law or in an amendment to the
Council Law, would likely enhance the consistency of decisions as well as
reduce tensions within the judiciary.
Another difficulty the Council faces is the Justices' short term on the
Council bench. Since the President and the Control Yuan nominate, appoint
and confirm Grand Justices for only nine year terms, job security for Grand
Justices is limited. 129 In contrast, all judges in the other courts of the Judicial
have a certain number of Grand Justices to take charge of matters specified in Article 78 of this
Constitution...."
12 7
See infra text accompanying notes 181-189.
128 ROC CONST., supra note 4, at art. 82, "The organization of the Judicial Yuan and of the law
courts12of9 various grades shall be prescribed by law."
ROC CONsT., supranote 4, at art. 79.
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Yuan are career judges. Additionally, while no Grand Justice has ever been
removed in mid-term, the Control Yuan has the constitutional authority to do
so.130 The lack of tenure gives the Council, at the very least, an appearance
of political susceptibility. Regardless of the merits of the semantic debate
over whether Grand Justices are "judges" or whether the Council is a "court"
under the Constitution, the fact remains that life tenure would effectively limit
the opportunity for external influence. It could also solve any existing
compatibility problems between the other judicial sub-branches and the
Council by clarifying the Grand Justices' positions.
Perhaps the Council's greatest limitation is the retaliatory atmosphere in
which it must operate. Due to an incomplete separation of powers, the
Council has never been sufficiently isolated to avoid political entanglements
with other branches. A prime example of a parallel branch exerting political
pressure on the Council is that of the Legislative Yuan, which has
constitutional authority to limit the Council's jurisdiction by amending the
Council's governing law. 131 The Legislative Yuan first utilized this power in
1957, when the Council released Interpretation Shih-76, holding that the
Legislative Yuan, National Assembly, and Control Yuan were each
equivalent to a Congress or Parliament in the Western sense.132 The
Legislative Yuan, which considered itself the ROC's only legislative body,
enacted the Council Law a short time later.133 This law restricted the
Council's constitutional interpretations to those issues specifically set forth in
the Council Law and in the text of the Constitution.1 34 With this one
enactment, the Legislative Yuan significantly narrowed the Council's
previously broad advisory powers. While the Legislative Yuan's authority to
amend the Council's governing law is a part of the ROC government's system
of checks and balances, its broad application to strip the Council of
substantial jurisdiction has been criticized as an unconstitutional abuse. 135
The Council Law also places the Council in another untenable position: the
13 0
13 1

id.at art.
81.
ROC CONST., supra note 4, at art. 63.
132 Council Interp. Shih-76 issued on May 3, 1957, which held that the Legislative Yuan, National
Assembly, and Control Yuan were all equivalent to a Congress or Parliament in the Western sense.
Council Interpretations bear the appellation "Shih" and are numbered chronologically. See Compilation
of Council of GrandJutices'lnterpretations,
in BOOK OF THE Six LAWS (Wu-nan), supranote 4, at 2141.
133 Fa,supra note 94, at 202.
134 "The subjects of interpretation shall be limited to the text of the Constitution." Council Law,
supranote 91, at art.
3.
135 Lawrence Shao-liang Liu, Judicial Review and the Constitution: A Tale of Two Institutions,
1988 PROC. OF THE INTL CONF. ON "THE EVOLVING U.S. CONSTrrTTON: 1787-1987" ACADEMIA SINICA
179 (1988).
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possibility exists that the Council could unify several conflicting laws but be
unable to interpret the constitutionality of the resulting law. 136 The Council,
however, has not ruled on the enactment's constitutionality, apparently due to
37
the issue's political sensitivity.1
Although the Council has operated under the Council Law restrictions
since 1957, the membership of the Legislative Yuan has changed. Reformist
factions within the government, as well as in academic circles and opposition
parties, have been working to resolve the problems of inappropriate
inter-branch influences since the reforms began. 138 In recognition that the
Council Law limitation prevents the Council from fulfilling its duties, the
recent constitutional amendment committee issued a proposal to revise the
Council Law. 139 One revision not suggested by that committee, but which
would ensure greater independence for the Council, would be to require the
Executive and Legislative Yuans to concur before imposing restrictions. The
current system, permitting one branch of government to unilaterally limit
another, does not foster a productive resolution of conflicting interests.
The Council's failure to rule on the constitutionality of the Council Law
is indicative of the effect of these multiple political pressures on the Council's
ability to fully exercise its interpretive powers. The Grand Justices carefully
weigh each decision to ensure that the other government branches will honor
its interpretations. 140 Though the Constitution gives the Council the potential
to influence policy, the Council generally plays a non-active role, deferring to
presidential or legislative intent. This is due to the Council's lack of
enforcement ability, the questions regarding the constitutionality of the
advisory power, and the confrontational manner in which government
agencies often react to adverse Council interpretations; a realistic possibility
exists that a "losing" agency will simply ignore the ruling. 141 At a time when
the Council seeks the full constitutional breadth of its powers, the failure of a
136 This could occur because the Council can unify any type of law brought before it by government
branches, yet the Council Law limits the types of issues that the Council can interpret.
137 Id.
38
1 LIN TSE-YI, SIAN KAI CHIEN YEN 1 [SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISING THE CONsTITTmON] (April 11,
1112'i 3 9
Id. at 16.
140 See Ma, supra note 5, at 500.
141 Although Council conflicts with some agencies have been minimal, Council decisions which
affect not only a yuan's power, but consequently reduce KMT power, presenting a different problem. As
the KMTs direct control of the government declines, various branches of government exercise greater
control and independence and often espouse more than one view. After Election: CrisisforKMT, supra
note 80. The result is increasing inner-branch conflicts, for which no explicit constitutional resolution
process exists. LnJ, supranote 135, at 182.
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government agency to follow or support a Council ruling could severely

damage the Council's credibility with the public and other government
agencies. Therefore, the Council has adopted a strategy of incrementally
expanding its authority through non-confrontational interpretations, seeking
thereby to reduce the risk of government branches censuring the Council or

placing further limits on its powers.
Ill.

FROM ILLUSION To POWER: A DECADE OF REFORM

The Council's gradualist approach toward regaining its full
constitutional authority has made significant contributions in the areas of
individual rights and political reform. As discussed earlier, the reforms the
ROC underwent during the 1980s spurred many changes in social, political
and legal structures. 142 In 1987, the Legislative Yuan finally repealed the
1948 "temporary" Emergency Decree, 143 reducing the President's power and
removing one of the structural limitations on the Council. With a rapidly
developing economy and a rising standard of living, people demanded more
political and personal freedom. 144 The government had to respond to the
pressures generated by an increasingly affluent and educated citizenry. This
resulted in the shift from a heavily centralized governing structure to
145
democratic capitalism.
The Council of Grand Justices responded to the public's dissatisfaction
with the government by issuing interpretations which emphasized
constitutional rights.146 The number of constitutional interpretations the
Council made per year increased from three in 1976 to eighteen in 1991.147
The Council not only rendered more interpretations, but it also heard more
cases brought by private individuals. 148 Prior to 1976, only one interpretation
resulted from a citizen's petition; government agencies brought the remainder
have
of interpretation requests. 149 Ever since, however, private citizens
50
presented the majority of applications considered by the Council.'

142 See YEARBOOK, supra note 17, at 91.
143 SHAW, supra note 3, at 28.
144 Politics ofDestiny, supra note 53, at S16.
145 Politics of Change, ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 1992.

146 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 1990 HuMAN RIGHTs REPORT: TAIWAN 9 (1991).
147 See Tables of Statistics in SYMPOSIUM, supranote 5, at 565-6.
14 8 Fa, supra note 94, at 207.
149 See Tables of Statistics in SYMPOSIUM, supranote 5, at 565-6.
150 Id.
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Although the Council's authority is theoretically limited only by the
Constitution, the realities of the ROC government necessitate that the Council
act cautiously. When a Council interpretation minimally affects another
branch, that branch generally acquiesces, but if an interpretation significantly
reduces or restricts an agency's activities, it will likely retaliate. 15 1 The
Council's utilization of incremental precedents attempts to avoid such
reactions. Once a branch acquiesces to an interpretation, the precedent
makes opposition to a similar interpretation at a later date difficult.
The Council's patient approach to regaining its full authority developed
against a backdrop of relative political powerlessness. Council Interpretation
Shih-86, rendered in 1960, provides the clearest example of the Council's
reason for carefully considering political factors. 152 The Council stated that
the Constitution placed the court system within the Judicial Yuan, not within
the Executive Yuan, where it was located at that time. 153 This interpretation
proved to be a severe miscalculation on the part of the Second Council
154
Only in 1980 did the
because the government blatantly ignored it.
government finally acknowledge the interpretation and transfer the court.
system to the Judicial Yuan.155 This interpretation serves as an open
reminder that until the Council receives its full constitutional authority, it
cannot interpret the Constitution without considering political realities.
Recent interpretations have furthered individual rights and advanced
political reforms. 15 6 The interpretations generally fall into three categories.
First, the interpretations which strengthen individuals' personal liberties have
enhanced citizens' ability to petition the Council for redress. Second, the
Council used several government petitions to successfully push back the
constraints of the Council Law and widen the scope of the petitions it can
grant. Third, in a relatively new line of interpretations, the Council has
placed certain limitations on unconstitutional government conduct.

151 The clearest example was the Legislative Yuan's reaction to the Council's "Congress
Interpretation." See supranote 134.
152 See Compilation of Council of Grand Jutices' Interpretations, in BOOK OF THE SIX LAWS
(Wu-nan), supra note 4, at 2142.
153 Id. During the initial period of martial law the government apparently considered grouping the
regular courts with the prosecutorial department to be the most efficient way of administering the law.
The Judicial Yuan at this time did not exercise much influence because its constitutionally mandated
functions of the judiciary were controlled by the Executive Yuan.
154 See Ma, supranote 5,at 501-500.
155 Id.
156 See LIN, supra note 138, at 16.
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StrengtheningPersonalLiberties

The Council's activism in interpreting individual rights stemmed from
its efforts early in the reform period to establish its credibility as an impartial
tribunal. Due to the Council's inaction during Chiang Kai-shek's rule, the
Council had emerged from its judicial dormancy with few authoritative
precedents and an image of ineffectiveness. The Council, through several
seminal interpretations which addressed individual freedoms, gained the
confidence of the reform-minded public while incrementally establishing its
base of authority.
In the first of this series of decisions, Council Interpretation Shih-154,
the Council considered a petition that, if granted, would place the Council in
direct opposition to the Supreme Court and the rest of the Judicial Yuan. 157
Failing to grant the petition, however, would indicate that the Council would
not, or could not, overturn a Supreme Court precedent. Faced with the
dilemma of either opposing the regular courts or acknowledging a significant
limitation upon its power, the Council chose a middle course. The petitioner
in this case argued that a Supreme Court precedent was unconstitutional
because it deprived him of access to the courts. 158 The Council held that
laws, regulations, and decrees of final judgments, including binding judicial
precedents, could be challenged by private citizens unless the Supreme Court
deemed otherwise in a special meeting.159 The Council indicated it could and
would review the constitutionality of judicial precedents under Article 4 of
the Council Law, 160 however, the Council did not substantively review the
decision of the Supreme Court in the petitioner's case for
unconstitutionality.161 Since in this case it did not actually overturn the
Supreme Court's decision, the Council avoided hostile reactions from the
Judicial and Legislative Yuans, yet broadened its future review powers.

157 3422 TSUNG-T'UNG Fu KUNG-PAO (PRESIDENTIAL PALACE GAZETrE) 2 (Sept. 29, 1978)
[hereinafter PRESIDENTIALPALACE GAzErrE].

158 Liu, supra note 28, at 1022.

159 3422 PRESIDENTIAL PALACE GAZETTE, supra note 157, at 2.

160 "The application for a constitutional interpretation is possible under the following
circumstances: (I) If the national or local government department has doubts as to the proper application
of the Constitution while performing its duties; or if a dispute arises between departments with regard to
the application of the Constitution while performing its duties; or if a question is raised as to whether an
application of a law or regulation is in conflict with the Constitution;..." Council Law supra note 91, at
art. 4.
161 3422 PRESIDENTIALPALACE GAZETTE, supra note 157, at 2.
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Council Interpretation Shih-177162 was a landmark interpretation in
the gradual process of strengthening personal liberties. Rendered in
November 1982, this interpretation held that newly decided constitutional
interpretations applied to the case which petitioned the issue. Prior to this
decision, a private petitioner could not benefit from a favorable Council
interpretation because the ruling would not apply to the petitioner's instant
case. 163 Council Interpretation Shih-177 involved the question of whether
the court's failure to apply a statute affecting the result of an adjudication
should be grounds for a retrial.164 The Council held that an interpretation
could
favorable to a private citizen's petition applied to that petitioner, who
165 This
procedures.
legal
established
the
with
accordance
in
then seek relief
interpretation furthered the Council's position as the judicial body of last
resort because it expanded the applicability of Council interpretations to an
Moreover, the interpretation encouraged
additional body of cases.
individuals to use the court system, since a petitioner could get actual relief
instead of being a test case.
The Council's interpretations often protected personal liberties by
In the 1988 Council Interpretation
limiting government discretion.
66 the Council struck down a provision of the Tax Collection Law
Shih-224,1
as unconstitutional because it interfered with citizens' right of access to the
courts under three different articles: 167 Article 16, which protects individuals'
right of access to the courts;168 Article 7, which guarantees the right of
equality; 169 and Article 19, which guarantees that taxes shall be paid only in
accordance with legislation. 170 The Council found the provision, which
required the posting of a bond before the tax office would re-examine a tax
assessment, constituted an unnecessary constraint on citizens' constitutional
rights. 17 1 The Council then set a two year time limit for the legislature to pass
amendments to bring the law into compliance with its interpretation, after
which the challenged provisions would become void.
162 4063 PRESIDENTIALPALACE GAZETTE, supra note 157, at 2 (Nov. 5, 1982).
163 Fa, supranote 94, at 207.
164 4063 PRESIDENTIAL PALACE GAZETTE, supra note 157, at 2.
165 Id.
166 4926 PRESIDENTIALPALACE GAZETTE, supra note 157, at I (April 22, 1988).
167 Id.
168 ROC CoNsT., supra note 4, at art. 16, "The people shall have the right of petition,
administrative appeal, and suit"
169 Id. at art. 7, "All people of the Republic of China, irrespective of sex, religion, race, class, or
party affiliation, shall be equal before the law."
170 Id. at art. 19, "The people shall have the duty of paying taxes in accordance with law."
171 Fa, supra note 94, at 207.
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The following year in June 1989, the Council rendered Interpretation
Shih-242,172 re-emphasizing the Council's accessibility to the public. For
the first time in ROC history, the Council declared a Supreme Court judgment
unconstitutional.173 The case arose after ROC citizens finally received
official permission to travel to the mainland. 174 A citizen who had fled to
Taiwan when the KMT forces retreated there in 1949 had been unable to
locate his wife at the time of his escape. 175 Not knowing if his first wife had
survived, he married again in 1960.176 In 1986, his first wife discovered he
was alive and sued for the nullification of his second marriage under Civil
Law provision 992.177 Since there was no explicit statute of limitation
governing the annulment of bigamous marriages, the regular courts ruled in
favor of the first wife. 178 The Council ordered a retrial, finding Civil Code
provision 992 in violation of Article 22 of the Constitution 79 because
enforcement of the Civil Code provision would disrupt social order.180
The cumulative effect of these interpretations has been to significantly
increase the ability of citizens to petition the Council. This enhanced
accessibility to the judicial process has encouraged individuals to challenge
laws and government agency actions which violate constitutionally
guaranteed freedoms. The Council's willingness to address issues affecting
individuals gave the Council credibility with ROC citizens and allowed the
Council to establish important precedents it would use in future decisions as
the basis of its authority.
2.

Overcoming ProceduralImpediments

A growing number of Council interpretations demonstrate the Council's
recognition that it must protect the scope of the petitions it grants. A separate
concern paralleled in many of these cases is the Council's attempt to ensure
that both the litigants and the other sub-branches of the Judicial Yuan comply
with its interpretations.
172 5116 PRESlDENTIALPALACE GAZETrE, supra note 157, at 2 (June 23, 1989).

173 Li & Fan, supra note 105, at 69.
174 The official ban on travel to the mainland was lifted in July of 1987. See Politics of Destiny,
supra note 53, at S16.
175 Li & Fan, supra note 105, at 70.
176 Id.
177.ld.
17 8

Id.

179 ROC CONST., supra note 4, at art. 22, "All other freedoms and rights of the people that are not
detrimental to social order or public welfare shall be guaranteed under the Constitution."
180 Li & Fan, supranote 105, at 71.
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A relatively minor administrative case provided an early opportunity
for the Council to address both issues. Council Interpretation Shih-148,
8
rendered in May 1977, involved the modification of a city zoning. plan.'1
The Administrative Court ruled the modification constituted a legal
administrative action uniformly affecting a class of citizens, which meant it
was not justiciable. The Administrative Court indicated that in order to be
challenged, the modification had to discriminate or injure a single individual,
who then had standing to sue. Prior Administrative Court precedent,
however, had specifically held that challenges to zoning modifications could
be entered by any affected plaintiff, regardless of the number of people
affected by the change. 182 Ordinarily, this qualified as an administrative
issue; the petitioner, therefore, could not bring the case to the Council
because the subject fell outside Council Law requirements.' 8 3 The Council,
however, heard the dispute on its own resolution-a method not addressed in
its own jurisdiction by
the Council Law.' 8 4 The Council thus expanded
185
creating an alternative route to receive petitions.
The Council was slower, although ultimately successful, in getting the
petitioner actual relief. The Council held the case should be addressed in
7
retrial, 186 but the Administrative Court did not accept it for retrial.' 8 The
Council did not press the Administrative Court on this issue, but two years
later released Council Interpretation Shih-156, holding that the modification
of a zoning plan constituted an administrative action identifiable to a
particular group or person.' 8 8 The petitioner in this case was the original
petitioner in Shih-48. After the Councilts ruling, any citizen or citizens
adversely affected by a modification could oppose the change by filing an
administrative petition or bringing suit.'8 9 By expressly defining the
181 Council Interp. Shih-148 of May 6, 1977, SSU-FA YUAN TA-FA-KUAN HUI-Y] CHIEH-SHIH
HUI-PIEN (COMPILATION OF INTERPRETATIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF GRAND JUSTICES, JUDICIAL YUAN)

CIC] 1 (4th ed. 1984).
[hereinafter
2
18 Id. at 2.
183 Council Law, supranote 91, at art. 3.
184 Liu, supra note 28, at 1021. The specifics of the resolution process are not documented in
Council interpretations and it appears to be used infrequently, due most likely to its controversial and
possibly unconstitutional nature. Soon after this interpretation, the Council established several other
methods to avoid the subject matter restrictions of the Council Law. See infra text accompanying notes
191-194 (Interpretation Shih-165) and 195-202 (Interpretation Shih-175).
185 Id.
186 "A retrial is a proceeding whereby a litigant can seek a rehearing on the basis of newly
discovered facts." Liu, supra note 28, at 1021 n. 127.
187 Id. at 1021.
188 3495 PRESIDENTIALPALACE GAZETrE, supra note 157, at 5 (April 4, 1979).
189 Id.
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modification as justiciable, this interpretation bound the Administrative Court
to hear all future suits of the same nature, including the case of the rebuffed
petitioner.
As previously discussed, the greatest impediment the Council faces in
attaining its full constitutional authority is the Council Law. The most
restrictive element of the Council Law is the provision limiting the Council to
interpretations on subjects specifically written in the Constitution. 190 To
overcome this particular limitation, the Council has made several
interpretations on matters closely related to, but not actually contained in, the
Constitution.
Council Interpretation Shih-165191 stated that the qualified speech
immunity of local council members applied only to deliberations in the local
council; it did not apply when council members abused such immunity by
making defamatory or unlawful statements. 192 The Council indicated that
while the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of speech, it does not
guarantee speech immunity. 9 3 Although this case revolved around a
constitutional issue, the Council also re-affirmed that the Legislative Yuan
could create qualified speech immunity, which is a subject outside the text of
the Constitution. As the Legislative Yuan was unlikely to challenge the
favorable ruling, the Council established a precedent extending its jurisdiction
beyond the Council Law. 194
The Council took a similar approach in a later case by finding
jurisdiction implicit in the ROC Constitution. In Council Interpretation
Shih-175,195 the Council held that the Judicial Yuan had the authority to
sponsor bills to the Legislative Yuan. 196 Although the Constitution explicitly
grants the Legislative, 197 Executive, 198 and Examination' 99 Yuans authority to
sponsor legislation in specific fields, the Judicial Yuan does not have a similar
explicit power. The Judicial Yuan also could not directly petition the Council
for an interpretation because of the inherent conflict of interest with its
sub-branch; it had to wait for a coordinate branch of government to bring the
190 Council Law, supra note 91, at art. 3.
191 3725 PRESIDENTIALPALACE GAZETTE, supra note 157, at 2 (Sept. 12, 1980).
19 2 Id.
193 Liu, supra note 28, at 1022.
19 4
,ld.
195 3989 PRESIDENTIAL PALACE GAZETTE, supranote 157, at 3 (May 25, 1982).
196 Ma, supranote 5, at 502.
19 7 ROC CONST., supra note 4, at arts. 63 and 72.
198 Id. at art. 57.
199 Id.at art. 87.
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petition. When the Control Yuan brought a petition to clarify its own
authority to sponsor legislation, 200 the Council worded the interpretation
broadly so all branches had authority to sponsor legislation in their specific
fields. 20 1 Thus, the Judicial Yuan could thereafter sponsor legislation related
to the organic structure ofjudicial bodies and the exercise ofjudicial power.
In Interpretation Shih-185,202 the Council declared its interpretations
binding on all government agencies and in-country citizens; any inconsistent
precedent was invalid. 20 3 After this ruling, if a regular court applied any law,
regulation or decree which the Council had found inconsistent with the
Constitution, the affected litigant could seek a retrial or an extraordinary
appeal based on the Council's statement of the law. 204 This interpretation
placed the Council in conflict with the Administrative Court; for the first time,
the Council overruled an Administrative Court precedent. Although the
Council's grounds for this decision are not clear from the opinion, the Council
apparently found the court's ruling a violation of the petitioner's constitutional
right of access to the courts, making the petition's subject matter irrelevant
and the Council Law's restrictions inapplicable. 20 5 This interpretation
established the Council's authority to review regular courts' precedents while
it also provided the Council with another avenue to reach non-constitutional
issues.
The Council, after slowly expanding its subject matter jurisdiction and
appellate review power, next addressed the difficulty of enforcing its
interpretations. The effective date of Council interpretations became of
greater importance when the Council began striking down unconstitutional
state actions. Although some Council interpretations included mandatory
deadlines for revising unconstitutional provisions, 20 6 not all Council rulings
required immediate action. As the Council had proclaimed the supremacy of
Council Interpretations, presumably all conflicting sources of law were
considered superseded. In reality, however, other branches of government
reacted to restrictive interpretations by implementing the required changes
slowly. 207 This directly challenged the Council's authority and frustrated the
Council's purpose, since the public still suffered the deprivation of recognized
200 Liu, supra note 28, at 1023 n. 137.
201 Id.
202 4251 PRESiDENTIALPALACE GAZEwrE, supranote 157, at 5 (Jan. 27, 1984).
203 ld.
204,ld.
205 Liu, supra note 28, at 1025.
206 See e.g. Council Interpretation Shih-224, supra text accompanying notes 166-171.
20 7
See Ma, supranote 5, at 500.
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In response to this situation, the Council issued

Council Interpretation Shih-188208 in August 1987, which held that an
interpretation came into effect on the date of the interpretation's issuance
unless otherwise set forth in the text. 209 The Council reiterated the
applicability of constitutional interpretations to the dispute in issue, as well as
all similarly pending cases. 210 This decisive interpretation indicated a
significant increase in the Council's confidence that other branches recognized
the Council as the supreme judicial body of government.
Procedural barriers such as the Council Law and the lack of
enforcement powers have slowed the Council's progress toward claiming its
constitutional status. The Council, however, has shown both creativity and
great patience in overcoming these restrictions through a steadily increasing
line of interpretations. The Council has escaped the unwarranted Council
Law jurisdictional limitation by establishing several alternate methods to
receive petitions; this expansion in the Council's subject matter and
constitutional jurisdiction made it possible for the Council to authoritatively
address issues affecting other Yuans.
C.

Defining the Government'sAppropriateSphere ofActivity

While the other sub-branches of the Judicial Yuan have occasionally
disagreed with the Council's interpretations, the most difficult petitions the
Council handles are those which challenge the constitutionality of another
branch's actions. These cases necessitate the Council use a cautious approach
in issuing interpretations that proscribe an agency's action in order to avoid
retaliation or additional restrictions on the Council's authority.
The need for this caution became apparent in the 1980 Council
Interpretation Shih-166,21 regarding the constitutionality of the Law
Governing Police Offenses (LGPO) under Article 8 of Constitution. 212 The
LGPO, enacted before the adoption of the Constitution, authorized law
208 4333 PRESIDENTIAL PALACE GAZETTE, supra note 157, at 2 (Aug. 3, 1984).
209 Id.
210.Id.

211 3749 PRESIDENTIAL PALACE GAzETrE, supra note 157, at 6 (Jan. 19, 1990).
212 ROC CONST., supra note 4, at art. 8 "Personal freedom shall be guaranteed to the people.
Except in the case of flagrante delicto as provided by law, no person shall be arrested or detained
otherwise than by a judicial or a police organ in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. No
person shall be tried or punished otherwise than by a law court in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. Any arrest, detention, trial, or punishment which is not in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law may be resisted."
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enforcement authorities to impose administrative confinement and punitive
labor on detainees. 2 13 Although the Constitution provided that the court
system decide all sanctions, 214 the police force, located within the Executive
Yuan, historically exercised extensive powers in this area. An interpretation
drastically curtailing these police powers would inevitably draw a strong
negative reaction from the Executive Yuan and other branches. Upholding
the LGPO, however, would be an implicit admission that the Executive Yuan
could ignore the Constitution. To resolve this dilemma, the Council refrained
from issuing an interpretation declaring the law unconstitutional. 2 15 Rather, it
indicated law enforcement officials could impose administrative sanctions,
but that the LGPO should be amended expeditiously so as to provide for
appropriate court procedures to govern such sanctions as required by the
Constitution's Article 8.216 The Council recognized an outright ban on
police-imposed sanctions would likely be ignored, thus crippling its efforts.
The Council thus implicitly declared the LGPO provision unconstitutional,
but only partially limited the Executive Yuan's discretion to set punishment.
The Council was not so deferential to the administrative agencies or the
Administrative Court, both of which denied petitioners reviews of critical
employment decisions. In Council Interpretation Shih-187, 2 17 the Council
clarified that the Constitution protected government personnel's right to seek
the review of an agency's decision to deny the petitioner his pension because
of his prior political activities. 218 The Administrative Court had refused to
consider the merits of the case and rejected the petition, indicating the agency
ruling was final. In its interpretation, the Council modified a pre-1947
interpretation and overturned a 1961 Administrative Court precedent to the
extent they were inconsistent with its present holding. 219 In addition to the
large adverse affect on government agencies as a whole, the interpretation's
importance also stems from the Council's explicit use of earlier precedent to
explain its decision. The Council cited Council Interpretation Shih-154 as
the authority for which it could review the constitutionality of laws,
regulations and decrees applied in a final adjudication challenged by a private
The Council implicitly relied upon Council Interpretation
citizen. 220
213 Ma, supranote 5, at 499.
2 14
ROC CONST., supra note 4, at art. 8.
2 15
Ma, supranote 5, at 498.
2 16
Id
217 4301 PRESIDENTIAL PALACE GAZETTE, supranote 157, at 3 (May 18, 1984).
2 18
Id.
2 9
1 ,Id.
220 Id.
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Shih-185 in that it had the authority to review the constitutionality of
precedents and to invalidate them without stating specific unconstitutional
grounds. 22 1 Thus, the Council was able to use the results of its incremental
strategy to establish a review power over government agency decisions.
The Council ruled in favor of civil servants again a year and a half later
in the 1986 Council Interpretation Shih-201,222 in which it partially struck
down a similar Administrative Court precedent that denied civil servants the
right to appeal the results of internal administrative hearings. The Council
indicated that while government agencies had executive discretion to hold
disciplinary proceedings, denying judicial review was unconstitutionally
restrictive. 223 To review the Administrative Court's precedent, the Council
again relied on its authority to review precedents as established in Council
Interpretation Shih-185.224

On the strength of its prior interpretations, the Council began granting
petitions to review government actions in areas traditionally regulated by
other government branches. Due undoubtedly to the rapid pace of the ROC's
economic development, the Council issued several interpretations addressing
225
public and private economic liberties regulated by the Executive Yuan.
The Council appeared to follow the same incremental strategy it had in the
past, but due to a growing number of Council precedents and the Council's
past successes, the interpretations on economic issues reflected the Council's
progressive nature in a shorter interval than prior subject matters.
The Council addressed its first economic issue in Council
Interpretation Shih-204.226 In that case, the Council upheld the criminal
sanctions provisions in the Law of Negotiable Instruments (LNI) as
constitutional. The Council found that the prescription of criminal penalties
for loan defaults fell within the Legislative Yuan's discretion. 227 While the
interpretation stirred little controversy, the Council used the opportunity to
show its intention to review petitions on economic matters. In a warning to
private lenders, the interpretation stated that the criminal penalties were being
impermissibly, and at times unscrupulously, relied upon by private lenders as

221 See supratext accompanying notes 202-205 regarding Council Interpretation Shih-185.
222 4555 PRESDENTIAL PALACE GAZETrE, supra note 157, at 2 (Jan. 3, 1986).
2 23
Id.

224 Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 202-205 regarding Council Interpretation Shih-185.
225 Liu, supra note 28, at 1027.
226 4600 PRESIDENIAL PALACE GAZETTE, supra note 157, at 3 (April 11, 1986).
2 27

Id.
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fewer precautions to screen
a deterrent to default; lenders therefore took
228
repay.
to
ability
their
for
borrowers
potential
Four months later, the Council completely invalidated the implementing
rules of an investment incentive statute. The Ministry of Finance formulated
the regulations to limit the types of interest income that could be deemed
tax-free. 229 In Council Interpretation Shih-210, 230 the Council found the
regulations exceeded the statute's authorization and violated Article 19 of the
ruled a
Constitution. 231 This marked the first time the Council explicitly
232
challenged government action in contravention of the Constitution.
In the 1987 Council Interpretation Shih-214,2 33 the Council upheld the
234
constitutionality of several banking decrees issued by the Executive Yuan.
These decrees regulated the establishment of credit cooperatives, an action
235
The
the Council noted fell within the Executive Yuan's discretion.
the
Council
the
gave
non-confrontational nature of this interpretation
Yuan's
opportunity to establish its authority for evaluating the Executive
actions which pertained to economic matters in future petitions.
The Council effectively used this authority six months later in
Interpretation Shih-218 when it struck down tax regulations issued by the
Executive Yuan's Ministry of Finance. The regulation described the tax
236
assessment method as it applied to profits from the sale of real property.
The Council held the regulations violated the requirement of Article 19 of the
Constitution that taxes be paid in accordance with legislation. 237 The
interpretation stated the assessment criteria, which automatically defined
profit as twenty percent of the property sale proceeds, was unconstitutionally
arbitrary. 238 The Council placed a time limit on the validity of the tax
regulation, giving the Ministry of Finance six months to bring the tax
239
regulations into compliance.
Although assertive in the tax regulation case, the Council recognized it
risked possible retaliation if it overruled another of the Executive Yuan
228

Id.
Id.
230 Council Interp. Shih-210 of Oct. 17, 1986, 3 CIC 130 (1988).
231 Id. at 2; see supratext ofart. 19 at note 170.
232 Liu, supranote 28, at 1027.
233 4764 PRESIDENTIAL PALACE GAzEIrE, supra note 157, at 1 (April 17, 1987).
234 Id.
235 ld.
236 Council Interp. Shih-218 of Aug. 14, 1987,4 CIC 1 (1989).
2 37
ROC CONT., supra note 4, at art. 19.
238 Council Interp. Shih-218 of Aug. 14, 1987, 4 CIC 2 (1989).
239 Id. at 1.
229
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agency's regulations and took a different route when it ruled on a petition
challenging an agency's security regulations. The Council merely warned the
Executive Yuan in Interpretation Shih-222,24o rendered in February 1988, of
the questionable constitutionality of a ROC Securities and Exchange
Commission (ROCSEC) requirement. 24 1 The Council upheld the regulation
requiring listed companies' financial statements to be certified by public
accountant firms and not individual practitioners, but stated ROCSEC should
re-evaluate the need for that requirement. 242 This preserved the Council's
ability to review the regulations if ROCSEC failed to act.
The Council has revisited issues raised in prior petitions which, at the
time, the Council was unable to satisfactorily address due to the tentative
nature of its authority. In 1990, the Council re-evaluated the LGPO in
Council Interpretation Shih-251243 and held that certain sanctions, such as
confinement in correction centers, are unconstitutional infringements upon the
personal freedom of criminal defendants if authorized by the LGPO as
opposed to a court. 244 The Council also imposed an eighteen-month deadline
for the Legislative Yuan to amend the unconstitutional sections of the
LGPO. 245 This, in effect, completed the ruling the Council would likely have
issued ten years earlier in Constitutional Interpretation Shih-166, had a
Council ruling received the same deference in 1980 that it did in 1990.246 A
further indication of the confidence level of the Council, and of its credibility
with the public and private sectors, came in the Council's release of this
decision at a time when the crime rate in the ROC had reached an all time
high.247

When compared with the interpretations of fifteen years ago, the
assertive manner and speed with which the Council issues current opinions
demonstrates the Council's progress in establishing itself as the supreme
judicial body in the ROC government. The Council's championing of
individual rights helped build a foundation of public acceptance from which it
could expand its jurisdiction despite procedural barriers like the Council Law.
With precedents firmly established, the Council then had the ability to restrain
unconstitutional government actions. The Council has not yet gained the full
240 4899 PRESIDENTIAL PALACE GAZETTE, supra note 157, at 2 (Feb. 12, 1988).
241 Id.

242 Id.
243 5206 PRESIDENTIAL PALACE GAZETTE, supra note 157, at 1 (Jan. 19, 1990).
244

.1d. at 2.

245 Id.

246 See supra text accompanying notes 212-217.
247 Liu, supra note 28, at 1030.
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authority of its true constitutional role, however, as evidenced by current
opinions that only hint at the unconstitutionality of laws or permit long
implementation periods.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The political reforms of the early 1980s have resulted in extensive
changes to the ROC's government and political system. The Council of
Grand Justices have contributed significantly to the ongoing political reforms
through its constitutional interpretations which enhanced individual
constitutional rights and clarified the bounds of government authority. The
Council, however, continues to operate under substantive'and procedural
limitations which prevent it from utilizing its own constitutional authority. In
addition to difficulties within its own judicial branch, the Council has to
contend with challenges to its advisory powers and retaliatory actions from
other branches.
Modem Council decisions have been partially protected by the national
climate of political reform and the Council's own strategy to slowly regain its
authority. Council interpretations of the last ten years demonstrate how the
Council has incrementally expanded its authority to overcome the limitations.
The Council's advocacy of individual rights helped generate popular support,
allowing it to expand its jurisdiction despite procedural barriers like the
Council Law. The Council has also invalidated unconstitutional government
actions and regulations. Recent decisions that leave unconstitutional laws
untouched, however, indicated that the Council is still unable to fully exercise
the authority granted to it by the ROC Constitution. Only when reforms push
the ROC government to permit the Council to exist as a separate power
protected from outside influence will the Council of Grand Justices be able to
fulfill its Constitutional role as the supreme judicial body of the ROC.

